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Abstract	  
Developments	  in	  neuro-­‐technologies	  in	  the	  pharma-­‐medico	  sector	  give	  occasion	  to	  
question	  the	  new	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  human	  mind	  and	  body	  are	  constructed	  and	  
governed	  biopolitically	  (Rose	  2013).	  The	  promises	  of	  technology	  and	  science	  may	  have	  
lead	  the	  way	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  neurochemical	  social	  imaginary	  which	  is	  becoming	  
increasingly	  dominant	  for	  our	  way	  to	  represent	  the	  diseases	  of	  the	  brain.	  
	  
Despite	  the	  strength	  of	  this	  social	  imaginary,	  such	  neuro-­‐technologies	  have	  also	  been	  
followed	  by	  contestations	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  patients,	  
relatives	  and	  citizens	  in	  general.	  The	  paper	  therefore	  explores	  the	  way	  in	  which	  
knowledge	  representations	  of	  the	  neurochemical	  social	  imaginary	  take	  different	  forms	  
in	  the	  public	  debate	  about	  technology.	  To	  what	  extent	  and	  how	  are	  these	  
representations	  portrayed,	  debated,	  contested	  and	  challenged	  in	  the	  public	  domain?	  
	  
Such	  public	  contestations	  may	  give	  a	  (perhaps	  limited)	  scope	  for	  a	  certain	  level	  of	  
democratisation	  of	  an	  otherwise	  highly	  expert	  and	  science	  driven	  field	  of	  governance.	  
One	  form	  of	  contestation	  takes	  place	  on	  the	  level	  of	  risk	  communication	  seen	  as	  a	  
particular	  governmental	  practice	  as	  well	  as	  a	  language	  in	  which	  citizens	  can	  engage	  in	  
debating	  and	  contesting	  the	  particular	  statements	  and	  hypotheses	  of	  the	  neurochemical	  
social	  imaginary.	  Strydom	  (2008)	  amongst	  others	  sees	  risk	  communication	  exactly	  as	  a	  
process	  of	  democratisation	  of	  scientific	  discourse.	  The	  question,	  however,	  is	  whether	  the	  
risk	  discourse	  as	  a	  language	  of	  contestation	  is	  indeed	  rather	  limited?	  
	  
Drawing	  on	  particular	  neuro-­‐technological	  examples	  such	  as	  the	  medical	  treatments	  of	  
ADHD	  in	  children	  and	  anti-­‐depressant	  medicine	  the	  paper	  focuses	  on	  how	  the	  brain	  is	  
governed	  and	  how	  practices	  of	  governmentality	  develop	  in	  the	  complex	  interplay	  
between	  scientific	  discourse,	  technical	  promise	  and	  public	  ideas	  and	  images	  about	  
health	  and	  mental	  illness.	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Introduction	  
	  
Discussions	  in	  the	  public	  domain	  about	  medicine,	  mental	  illness	  and	  the	  related	  health	  
technologies	  and	  treatments	  are	  reoccurring	  in	  the	  media	  landscape	  in	  Danmark,	  as	  they	  
are	  in	  most	  other	  countries.	  While	  certain	  specific	  conditions	  apply,	  the	  case	  of	  Denmark	  
can,	  in	  many	  ways,	  shed	  light	  on	  some	  general	  problems	  relating	  to	  knowledge	  
representations	  in	  the	  psycho-­‐pharmaceutical	  field.	  It	  is	  a	  country	  with	  a	  strong	  and	  
reputable	  biomedical	  industry,	  it	  often	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  industry	  position	  
remains	  relatively	  unchallenged	  in	  many	  contexts.	  However,	  the	  Danish	  press	  does	  
cover	  different	  positions	  in	  the	  debate,	  thereby,	  painting	  a	  varied	  picture	  of	  an	  
important	  scientific	  controversy.	  	  
	  
The	  paper	  examines	  the	  way	  in	  which	  knowledge	  representations	  of	  technologies	  
relating	  to	  neurology	  and	  mental	  illness	  take	  different	  forms	  in	  the	  Danish	  public	  debate	  
about	  illness,	  health	  technology	  and	  science.	  Popular	  representations	  of	  science	  play	  an	  
important	  role	  in	  giving	  an	  insight	  into	  how	  new	  developments	  in	  science	  are	  
transferred	  to	  the	  popular	  imagination.	  They	  also	  reveal	  areas	  of	  debate	  and	  
contestation	  that	  arise	  when	  scientific	  findings	  are	  translated	  into	  the	  political	  field.	  	  
	  
The	  paper	  draws	  on	  the	  concept	  of	  social	  imaginary	  to	  understand	  the	  way	  in	  which	  a	  
scientific	  discourse	  of	  the	  brain	  is	  negotiated,	  debated	  and	  contested.	  In	  order	  to	  do	  this,	  
I	  make	  use	  of	  Foucault’s	  biopolitical	  approach	  and	  Rose’s	  analysis	  of	  neurological	  
science	  and	  medicine	  (Rose	  2013;	  Rose	  2007)	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  some	  tentative	  
answers	  to	  the	  questions:	  Can	  we	  talk	  about	  a	  neuro-­‐chemical	  social	  imaginary?	  What	  is	  
the	  form	  it	  takes	  and	  how	  is	  its	  meaning	  negotiated?	  And	  what	  are	  the	  consequences	  for	  
how	  the	  brain	  is	  governed?	  The	  paper	  argues	  that	  a	  neurochemical	  social	  imaginary	  can	  
be	  traced	  in	  the	  public	  debate	  and	  that	  this	  has	  important	  consequences	  for	  the	  way	  that	  
the	  human	  brain	  becomes	  an	  object	  for	  research	  as	  well	  as	  an	  object	  for	  governance.	  
	  
The	  argument	  is	  developed	  through	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  public	  reactions	  and	  the	  public	  
debate	  of	  the	  increasing	  diagnosis	  of	  ADHD	  in	  children	  and	  the	  increasing	  use	  of	  
medicine	  to	  treat	  the	  condition.	  ADHD	  as	  a	  case	  represents	  many	  of	  the	  central	  
questions	  ad	  points	  of	  disagreements	  of	  mental	  illness	  relating	  to	  the	  status	  and	  purpose	  
of	  diagnosis	  and	  treatment,	  the	  contested	  causes	  of	  ADHD	  and	  of	  questions	  of	  inclusion	  
and	  exclusion	  in	  relation	  to	  mental	  health.	  All	  these	  become	  relevant	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  
the	  neuro-­‐chemical	  social	  imaginary.	  It	  is	  conducted	  as	  a	  qualitative	  study	  of	  the	  media	  
coverage	  of	  ADHD	  in	  three	  Danish	  broadsheet	  newspapers.	  The	  newspapers	  Politiken,	  
Berlingske	  and	  Information	  are	  chosen	  in	  order	  to	  cover	  the	  political	  spectrum	  in	  the	  
Danish	  debate.	  Politiken	  and	  Berlingske	  are	  both	  fairly	  mainstream	  broadsheet	  
newspapers	  where	  the	  former	  expresses	  an	  editorial	  line	  to	  the	  left	  of	  the	  centre	  while	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Berlingske	  findsa	  itself	  more	  to	  the	  right.	  Information	  is	  a	  more	  narrow	  newspaper	  
which	  can	  be	  located	  further	  to	  the	  left	  than	  Politiken.	  While	  the	  study	  includes	  a	  
complete	  sample	  of	  all	  the	  articles	  in	  the	  chosen	  newspapers	  based	  on	  a	  search	  of	  the	  
word	  ADHD,	  the	  paper	  only	  quotes1	  a	  number	  of	  these	  which	  are	  of	  special	  relevance	  to	  
the	  paper’s	  focus	  on	  contestations	  over	  diagnosis	  and	  treatment.	  
	  
The	  emergence	  of	  a	  neuro-­‐chemical	  social	  imaginay	  
	  
In	  trying	  to	  establish	  some	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  the	  body	  and	  mind	  are	  governed	  
biopolitically,	  the	  case	  for	  the	  development	  of	  a	  neuro-­‐chemical	  social	  imaginary	  is	  
explored.	  Some	  studies	  of	  the	  social,	  ethical	  and	  indeed	  political	  aspects	  of	  mental	  health	  
call	  for	  a	  much-­‐needed	  debate	  of	  the	  assumptions	  inherent	  in	  the	  diagnosis	  of	  different	  
mental	  diseases	  and	  for	  the	  justification	  for	  the	  use	  of	  drug-­‐treatment.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  
ADHD,	  for	  instance,	  this	  is	  particularly	  pertinent	  in	  the	  light	  of	  there	  being	  ‘no	  clear	  and	  
indisputable	  scientific	  rationale	  for	  the	  growing	  rates	  of	  ADHD	  diagnosis	  and	  treatment	  
in	  children’	  (Singh	  2008:	  960).	  For	  Singh	  a	  social	  analysis	  can	  contribute	  to	  science	  in	  
order	  to	  ensure	  standardization	  and	  consistency	  in	  diagnosis	  and	  treatment	  thereby	  
illuminating	  us	  on	  at	  least	  some	  of	  the	  social	  causes	  of	  over-­‐	  and	  under-­‐diagnosis	  (Singh	  
2008:	  960f).	  While	  no	  one	  can	  deny	  the	  practical	  need	  for	  consistency	  in	  diagnosis,	  such	  
a	  focus	  neglects	  an	  analysis	  of	  how	  these	  very	  assumptions	  of	  diagnosis	  and	  mental	  
health	  –	  social	  as	  well	  as	  scientific	  -­‐	  develop	  as	  frames	  of	  meaning.	  	  
	  
The	  social	  imaginary,	  for	  Taylor,	  relates	  to	  how	  ordinary	  people	  imagine	  the	  world	  and	  
their	  social	  surroundings.	  ‘The	  social	  imaginary	  is	  that	  common	  understanding	  that	  
makes	  possible	  common	  practices	  and	  a	  widely	  shared	  sense	  of	  legitimay’	  (Taylor	  2004:	  
23).	  For	  Laclau	  myths	  provide	  a	  particular	  reading	  of	  a	  situation	  and	  a	  given	  myth	  may	  
aspire	  to	  or	  come	  to	  signify	  the	  very	  form	  of	  fullness	  and	  thus	  become	  a	  social	  imaginary	  
(Laclau	  1990:	  63).	  The	  subject	  becomes	  embedded	  in	  a	  given	  social	  imaginary	  and	  it	  will	  
seem	  like	  the	  only	  possible	  horizon	  of	  meaning	  (Taylor	  2004:	  	  17).	  
	  
Rose’s	  analysis	  of	  modern	  biopolitics	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  exploration	  of	  a	  changing	  social	  
imaginary.	  19th	  Century	  understandings	  of	  the	  biomedical	  body	  as	  a	  functional	  organism	  
and	  as	  a	  living	  system	  subjected	  to	  the	  clinical	  gaze	  has	  been	  challenged	  as	  a	  horizon	  of	  
meaning.	  It	  has,	  at	  least	  partly,	  been	  replaced	  with	  a	  new	  perception	  of	  life	  seen	  in	  terms	  
of	  a	  moleculized	  body.	  This	  development	  is	  intrinsically	  linked	  to	  the	  developments	  of	  
new	  techniques	  in	  life	  sciences:	  from	  19th	  Century	  dissections	  and	  its	  influence	  on	  
anatomical	  knowledge	  to	  the	  20th	  Century	  discovery	  of	  the	  DNA	  structures	  as	  well	  as	  
important	  discoveries	  within	  the	  pharma-­‐medical	  arena.	  The	  dominating	  metaphor	  for	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  All	  quotes	  are	  translated	  from	  Danish	  by	  the	  author.	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life	  went	  from	  being	  the	  living	  biological	  organism	  to	  being	  a	  linguistic	  system	  consisting	  
of	  relations	  of	  meaning.	  Life	  and	  bodies	  could	  be	  understood	  through	  codes,	  
information,	  messages	  etc.	  as	  a	  system	  of	  communication	  (Rose	  2007:	  44).	  This	  is	  
certainly	  also	  true	  of	  brain	  processes	  that	  are	  increasingly	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  very	  
complex	  interplay	  between	  genetics,	  chemical	  processes	  and	  electric	  and	  sensory	  
stimuli,	  to	  mention	  some	  of	  the	  relevant	  factors.	  
	  
For	  Foucault	  biopolitics	  is	  a	  control	  mechanism	  used	  on	  the	  population	  (Foucault	  1997:	  
242)	  or	  regulation	  and	  steering	  of	  life	  processes	  (Lemke	  2010:	  3).	  A	  biopolitical	  
approach	  to	  mental	  illness	  privileges	  neither	  politics	  nor	  life	  in	  the	  justification	  of	  
treatment	  and	  diagnosis	  but	  recognises	  the	  complex	  interplay	  and	  the	  instable	  borders	  
that	  exists	  between	  politics	  and	  life	  as	  it	  occurs	  in	  the	  ‘…practices	  of	  correction,	  
exclusion,	  normalization,	  disciplining,	  therapeutics	  and	  optimization’	  (Lemke	  2010:	  4f).	  
Biopolitics	  is	  therefore	  far	  from	  a	  centralised	  and	  unified	  discourse	  of	  governance	  but	  
consists	  also	  of:	  	  
	  
…	  strategies	  involving	  contestations	  over	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  human	  vitality,	  
morbidity,	  and	  mortality	  should	  be	  problematized,	  over	  the	  desirable	  level	  and	  form	  
of	  the	  interventions	  required,	  over	  the	  knowledge,	  regime	  of	  authority,	  and	  practices	  
of	  intervention	  that	  are	  desirable,	  legitimate,	  and	  efficacious	  (Rose	  2007:	  54)	  
	  
Biopolitcs	  thus	  becomes	  a	  matter	  of	  political	  contestations	  over	  life	  and	  the	  right	  to	  
one’s	  life	  and	  one’s	  body	  (Foucault	  1978:	  145).	  Such	  matters	  are	  no	  less	  relevant	  when	  
scrutinising	  biomedical	  technologies	  and	  understandings	  of	  the	  brain	  in	  the	  emergence	  
of	  a	  medico-­‐scientific	  discursive	  order.	  	  
	  
For	  Foucault,	  however,	  biopower	  can	  hardly	  be	  understood	  without	  reference	  to	  how	  
the	  governing	  techniques	  and	  practices	  interact	  with	  technologies	  of	  the	  self.	  Central	  to	  
these	  are	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  subject	  is	  enabled,	  through	  expert	  and	  institutional	  
discourse,	  to	  discover	  the	  truth	  about	  him-­‐/herself	  (Foucault	  1978;	  Dreyfus	  and	  
Rabinow	  1983:	  175).	  Rose	  sees	  a	  movement	  from	  the	  truth	  about	  the	  self	  being	  found	  in	  
a	  psychological	  therapeutic	  gaze	  of	  self-­‐discovery	  of	  one’s	  roots	  and	  origins	  as	  a	  cause	  
for	  distress	  and	  mental	  illness.	  This	  discursive	  order	  is,	  however,	  increasingly	  being	  
replaced	  by	  a	  genetic	  therapeutic	  truth	  regime	  which	  seems	  to	  provide	  one	  of	  the	  most	  
promising	  claims	  to	  discovery	  of	  the	  truth	  of	  the	  self	  and	  the	  origins	  of	  disorders	  (Rose	  
2013:	  227).	  The	  genetic,	  and	  also	  the	  chemical,	  scientific	  regime	  also	  increasingly	  seeks	  
to	  deliver	  on	  its	  promises	  of	  treatments	  inherent	  in	  new	  health	  technologies,	  both	  
pharmaceutical	  and	  genetic.	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Diagnosis	  in	  question:	  ADHD	  and	  scientific	  disagreement	  
	  
The	  Danish	  public	  debate	  on	  ADHD	  evolves	  around	  the	  status	  and	  the	  implications	  of	  
diagnosis	  in	  mental	  conditions.	  The	  fact	  that	  ADHD	  is,	  mostly,	  diagnosed	  in	  children	  
makes	  the	  topic	  particularly	  emotional	  and	  problematic.	  Qualitative	  coding	  shows	  that	  
the	  themes	  in	  the	  newspaper	  debate	  evolve	  around	  three	  topics	  all	  relevant	  to	  the	  
overall	  question	  of	  diagnosis:	  First	  of	  all	  the	  question	  of	  disagreement,	  both	  scientifically	  
and	  more	  generally,	  about	  the	  status	  of	  diagnosis.	  Equally	  important	  is	  the	  complex	  
relationship	  between	  inclusion	  and	  exclusion.	  Finally,	  the	  debate	  also	  raises	  the	  
controversy	  over	  the	  causes	  and	  thus	  the	  treatments	  to	  be	  employed.	  
	  
The	  question	  of	  over-­‐medication	  is	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  debate	  over	  diagnosis	  and	  
treatment	  of	  mental	  illness.	  Critical	  voices	  from	  the	  political	  and	  scientific	  communities	  
express	  concern	  over	  both	  the	  increase	  in	  diagnosis	  on	  a	  national	  level	  and	  the	  large	  
discrepancies	  between	  how	  much	  medicine	  is	  prescribed	  in	  different	  areas.	  The	  
different	  cases	  of	  reported	  diagnosis	  increases	  show	  a	  slight	  variance,	  however,	  they	  
show	  a	  clear	  indication	  of	  a	  problem.	  The	  concern	  is,	  for	  instance,	  expressed	  by	  the	  
Minister	  for	  Health	  Astrid	  Kragh:	  ‘I	  will	  encourage	  doctors	  to	  think	  twice	  before	  reaching	  
for	  the	  prescription	  pad’	  (Berlingske	  15-­‐04-­‐2013).	  However,	  this	  position	  does	  not	  stand	  
alone.	  It	  is	  countered	  by	  a	  call	  for	  a	  more	  complex	  or	  positive	  view	  of	  diagnosis.	  
Members	  of	  the	  psychiatric	  community	  express	  both	  highly	  critical	  and	  pro-­‐diagnosis	  
opinions	  in	  the	  media.	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  Statistics	  used	  as	  documentation	  in	  the	  media	  for	  level	  of	  medicination	  (to	  be	  expanded*)	  
Figure:	  number	  on	  ADHD	   Source	  quoted	   Reference	  
38.000	  in	  2012	  
Increase	  of	  3.000	  since	  2011	  
SSI:	  State	  Research	  and	  
Development	  Institute	  
Berlingske	  15-­‐04-­‐2013	  
41.000	  in	  2012	  
2.100	  in	  2000	  
Psychiatrist	  Henrik	  Day	  Poulsen	  
(author),	  Ekstra	  Bladet2	  
Berlingske	  19-­‐04-­‐2013	  
	  
Following	  a	  documentary	  called	  Denmark	  on	  Pills	  showed	  on	  the	  public	  service	  TV	  
station	  Danmarks	  Radio	  (DR)	  on	  the	  17th	  of	  April	  2013,	  the	  last	  of	  a	  three	  part	  series,	  all	  
newspapers	  had	  special	  focus	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  over-­‐diagnosis	  and	  over-­‐medication.	  There	  
are	  many	  examples	  of	  critical	  scientists	  and	  medical	  practitioners	  expressing	  a	  critical	  
view	  towards	  the	  current	  regime	  of	  diagnosis.	  One	  of	  these	  is	  psychiatrist	  Asker	  Stig	  
Nielsen	  who	  considers	  this	  development	  ‘insane’:	  ‘ADHD	  has	  become	  a	  fashion	  
phenomenon,	  and	  I	  feel	  that	  both	  patients	  and	  doctors	  can	  be	  much	  more	  critical’	  
(Berlingske	  15-­‐05-­‐2013).	  Likewise	  in	  an	  international	  context,	  Professor	  of	  medicine	  at	  
Yale,	  William	  Graf	  when	  presented	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  6,4	  million	  American	  boys	  have	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  tabloid	  newspaper	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been	  diagnosed	  with	  ADHD:	  ‘	  The	  numbers	  are	  astronomical.	  I	  am	  astonished’	  (Politiken	  
02-­‐04-­‐2013).	  These	  comments	  support	  the	  highly	  critical	  position,	  also	  brought	  forward	  
in	  the	  DR	  documentary,	  that	  psycho-­‐pharmacology	  has	  a	  particular	  problem	  with	  over-­‐
medication	  which	  is	  not	  based	  on	  sound	  scientific	  evidence	  but	  rather	  has	  its	  grounds	  in	  
what	  could	  be	  expressed	  in	  the	  following	  way:	  ‘Aggressive	  marketing	  from	  
pharmaceutical	  companies	  can	  lead	  to	  false	  epidemics’	  (Information	  17-­‐05-­‐2013).	  What	  
the	  last	  comment	  indicates	  is,	  of	  course,	  that	  diagnoses	  are	  not	  made	  on	  a	  sound	  
scientific	  grounding	  but	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  for	  commercial	  reasons.	  
	  
In	  a	  call	  for	  a	  scientifically	  founded	  debate	  about	  medication,	  psychiatrist	  Henrik	  Day	  
Poulsen	  writes	  a	  comment	  on	  the	  very	  critical	  reception	  of	  his	  critical	  book:	  Medicines	  
that	  kill.	  The	  book	  has,	  according	  to	  Poulsen,	  resulted	  in	  several	  colleagues	  withdrawing	  
from	  planned	  research	  collaboration.	  He	  finds	  it	  problematic	  also	  from	  a	  democratic	  
perspective	  that	  doctors,	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  and	  journalists	  are	  reluctant	  to	  
participate	  in	  the	  debate	  and	  engage	  with	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  false	  and	  true	  statements	  
on	  pills	  (Berlingske	  19-­‐04-­‐2013).	  This	  is	  also,	  indirectly,	  a	  call	  for	  more	  critical	  attitudes	  
to	  be	  voiced	  from	  the	  scientific	  community	  in	  the	  public	  debate.	  
	  
However,	  not	  all	  scientists	  are	  equally	  critical	  of	  the	  diagnosis	  system.	  Ole	  Mors,	  
professor	  at	  Aarhus	  University	  Hospital	  and	  chairman	  of	  the	  Danish	  Psychiatric	  
Association’s	  diagnosis	  committee,	  states	  a	  case	  for	  the	  diagnostic	  system	  and	  for	  the	  
benefit	  of	  establishing	  a	  scientifically	  based	  and	  standardised	  system	  for	  classification	  
and	  diagnosis.	  He	  also	  points	  out	  that:	  ‘The	  psychiatric	  units	  do	  not	  over-­‐diagnose	  in	  
Denmark	  (…)	  People	  who	  come	  to	  us	  (…)	  are	  really	  ill.	  But	  over-­‐diagnosis	  may	  occur	  at	  
the	  GP	  surgeries	  were	  there	  may	  be	  a	  different	  level	  of	  interest	  and	  training	  in	  mental	  
illness.	  The	  problem	  lies	  with	  light	  and	  moderate	  conditions.’	  (Information	  17-­‐05-­‐2013).	  
He	  thus	  argues	  for	  the	  scientific	  foundation	  of	  diagnosis	  and	  for	  making	  decisions	  based	  
on	  research	  and	  progress	  in	  knowledge.	  
	  
The	  Danish	  Health	  and	  Medicines	  Authority	  are	  working	  on	  national	  clinical	  guidelines	  
to	  ensure	  more	  uniform	  standards	  of	  treatment	  (Berlingske	  15-­‐04-­‐2013).	  These	  will	  
very	  likely	  be	  based	  on	  the	  coming	  US	  National	  Institute	  of	  Mental	  Health’s	  publication	  
of	  a	  new	  Diagnostic	  and	  Statistical	  Manual,	  the	  DSM	  5.	  The	  US	  DSM	  is	  important	  because	  
it	  sets	  the	  standard	  internationally	  and	  influences	  e.g.	  the	  WHO’s	  classification	  of	  mental	  
conditions.	  In	  an	  interview	  professor	  in	  Psychiatry	  Allen	  Frances,	  who	  was	  the	  lead	  
developer	  of	  the	  previous	  DSM	  4,	  expresses	  concern	  with	  the	  tendency	  to	  what	  he	  calls	  
‘diagnosis	  inflation’.	  This	  is	  particularly	  important	  due	  to	  the	  high	  risk	  of	  mortal	  side-­‐
effects	  in	  psycho-­‐pharmaceuticals.	  ‘DSM	  5	  will	  exacerbate	  diagnostic	  inflation	  by	  
introducing	  new	  untested	  diagnoses	  and	  reducing	  the	  boundaries	  for	  the	  existing	  ones’	  
(Information	  17-­‐05-­‐2013).	  The	  number	  of	  diagnoses	  is	  expected	  to	  increase	  from	  365	  in	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1994	  (DSM	  4)	  to	  400	  in	  DSM	  5.	  According	  to	  Information,	  some	  of	  the	  new	  diagnoses	  for	  
children	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  DMDD,	  Disruptive	  Mood	  Dysregulation	  Disorder,	  Binge	  
Eating	  Disorder	  and	  Internet	  Addiction.	  ADHD	  itself	  is	  a	  relatively	  new	  condition	  that	  
took	  over	  as	  classification	  unit	  from	  Damp	  and	  others	  (Singh	  2008).	  Recent	  debate	  
indicates	  that	  Asperger’s	  syndrome	  risks	  disappearing	  to	  be	  categorised	  as	  part	  of	  a	  
broader	  diagnosis.	  The	  renaming	  and	  re-­‐categorising	  are	  important	  elements	  in	  
managing	  and	  governing	  the	  brain	  as	  it	  provides	  the	  most	  important	  basis	  for	  diagnosis	  
and	  treatment.	  
	  
Causes	  and	  treatments	  
	  
Technological	  promise	  is	  a	  central	  prerequisite	  to	  the	  development	  of	  a	  neuro-­‐chemical	  
social	  imaginary.	  Two	  developments	  are	  central	  in	  that	  respect:	  The	  brain	  is	  increasingly	  
seen	  as	  being	  central	  to	  understanding	  the	  human	  self.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  
new	  techniques	  for	  measuring	  and	  viewing	  brain	  activity,	  the	  visions	  of	  the	  brain	  itself	  
are	  changing.	  This	  knowledge	  transformation,	  happening	  gradually	  in	  line	  with	  
developments	  in	  research,	  starts	  within	  the	  scientific	  arena	  but	  spreads	  to	  the	  wider	  
public	  sphere.	  The	  brain	  is	  seen	  increasingly	  as	  a	  neuro-­‐molecular	  unit	  which	  can	  be	  
visualised	  with	  new	  techniques	  such	  as	  fMRI3	  providing	  the	  foundation	  for	  the	  promise	  
of	  technological	  progress.	  Rather	  than	  a	  fixed	  unit	  the	  brain	  is	  increasingly	  understood	  
in	  terms	  of	  plasticity	  and	  adaptability	  (Rose	  2013).	  
	  
Two	  examples	  of	  technological	  optimism	  are	  reported	  in	  the	  examined	  material.	  First	  of	  
all	  and	  of	  a	  more	  general	  technological	  nature,	  a	  new	  research	  centre,	  Dandrite,	  at	  
Aarhus	  University	  and	  the	  European	  Molecular	  Biology	  Laboratory	  will	  specialise	  in	  
molecular	  neurology.	  In	  laypersons	  terms	  this	  is	  described	  as	  ‘how	  brain	  cells	  
fundamentally	  communicate	  through	  chemical	  and	  electric	  processes.	  This	  will	  influence	  
almost	  everything	  that	  goes	  on	  in	  the	  brain	  and	  be	  of	  importance	  to	  a	  long	  string	  of	  
neurological	  illnesses’	  (Politiken	  01-­‐03-­‐2013).	  The	  second	  technological	  promise	  has	  to	  
do	  with	  optogenetics	  which	  combines	  optics	  and	  genetics	  to	  control	  neurons	  in	  order	  to	  
stimulate	  the	  brain.	  As	  described	  in	  the	  article,	  the	  technique	  promises:	  ‘a	  switch	  on/off	  
button	  in	  the	  brain’	  working	  through	  light	  sensitivity	  and	  genetics	  (Berlingske	  12-­‐03-­‐
2013).	  This	  research	  has	  been	  awarded	  with	  a	  Brain	  Research	  Prize.	  This	  is	  also	  an	  
example	  of	  the	  increasing	  importance	  of	  interdisciplinarity	  in	  neuro-­‐science.	  
Technological	  progress,	  to	  a	  large	  extent,	  relies	  on	  the	  floating	  borders	  between	  
disciplines	  such	  as	  science,	  chemistry,	  biology	  and	  engineering.	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Functional	  Magnetic	  Resonance	  Imaging	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The	  causes	  of	  ADHD	  are	  still	  very	  unclear.	  They	  may	  be	  genetic,	  cognitive,	  evolutionary,	  
environmental	  or	  social	  –	  or	  they	  may	  likely	  be	  a	  combination	  of	  some	  or	  all	  of	  these	  
factors.	  Gaining	  further	  knowledge	  of	  the	  causes	  of	  ADHD	  is,	  of	  course,	  central	  to	  the	  
knowledge	  of	  treatments.	  About	  the	  scientific	  uncertainty	  professor	  Ole	  Mors	  says,	  
quoting	  his	  colleague	  professor	  Albert	  Gjedde:	  ‘It	  is	  unclear	  what	  concrete	  knowledge	  
about	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  brain	  the	  increasingly	  numerous	  diagnoses	  in	  the	  DSM	  rest	  
on.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  the	  pharmaceutical	  industry	  is	  running	  their	  heads	  against	  the	  wall	  
as	  the	  lack	  of	  knowledge	  about	  the	  causes	  for	  the	  symptoms	  makes	  it	  difficult	  to	  conduct	  
purposeful	  research’	  (Information	  17-­‐05-­‐2013).	  
	  
The	  possible	  multiplicity	  of	  causes	  for	  ADHD	  invoke	  the	  classical	  discussion	  of	  the	  
interplay	  between	  nature	  and	  nurture:	  One	  comment,	  from	  a	  layperson,	  who	  is	  a	  mum	  of	  
four	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Association	  for	  Young	  Families,	  draws	  on	  both	  the	  complexity,	  
uncertainty	  and	  the	  nature/nurture	  debate.	  She	  is	  concerned	  about	  a	  possible	  
connection	  between	  levels	  of	  cortisol	  related	  to	  stress	  in	  children’s	  blood	  when	  they	  
start	  nursery.	  Some	  researchers	  see	  this	  as	  an	  indication	  of	  a	  connection	  between	  
permanently	  high	  levels	  of	  cortisol	  and	  psychological	  conditions	  such	  as	  ADHD	  
(Information	  02-­‐03-­‐2013).	  The	  author	  speaks	  as	  an	  advocate	  for	  a	  later	  nursery	  start	  for	  
young	  children	  and	  establishes	  a	  link	  between	  environmental,	  social	  and	  neurochemical	  
factors.	  Her	  argument	  may	  appear	  to	  be	  pro-­‐nurture	  but	  due	  to	  the	  complexity	  envoked	  
cortisol	  may	  also	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  ‘natural’	  component	  that	  can	  be	  affected	  by	  other	  factors	  
such	  as	  genetic	  disposition	  (this	  is,	  however,	  only	  expressed	  indirectly	  in	  the	  comment).	  
	  
In	  contrast	  to	  the	  causal	  complexity	  stands	  biochemist	  Lone	  Frank,	  author	  of	  the	  book	  
My	  Beautiful	  Genome.	  Exposing	  our	  Genetic	  Future,	  One	  Quirk	  at	  a	  Time.	  In	  this	  book	  she	  
expresses	  a	  large	  degree	  of	  genetic	  and	  technological	  determinism	  when	  she	  examines	  
her	  own	  genetic	  disposition	  to,	  for	  instance,	  depression	  and	  other	  mental	  conditions	  and	  
is	  on	  the	  search	  for	  the	  ‘new	  biological	  man’	  (Frank	  2011).	  She	  has	  even	  a	  few	  years	  ago	  
gone	  as	  far	  as	  to	  speak	  in	  favour	  of	  EPO	  and	  Ritalin	  as	  expanding	  our	  concept	  of	  
normality	  and	  thus	  creating	  a	  new	  normal	  standard	  for	  how	  the	  body	  can	  perform	  
(Information	  17-­‐06-­‐2010).	  While	  Frank	  may	  be	  unique	  in	  the	  extremity	  of	  technical	  
determinism,	  her	  position	  can	  be	  traced	  in	  many	  other	  approaches	  to	  ADHD,	  both	  
amongst	  experts	  searching	  for	  new	  treatments	  and	  relatives/patients	  looking	  for	  
answers	  when	  they	  seek	  to	  make	  sense	  of	  a	  complex	  condition.	  Also	  important	  is	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  technological	  determinism	  often	  tends	  to	  provide	  the	  basis	  for	  technique	  of	  
governance	  and	  governmentality	  within	  the	  health	  care	  system.	  This	  way	  to	  see	  mental	  
conditions	  has	  possible	  implications	  for	  how	  the	  self	  is	  perceived	  and	  how	  ADHD	  is	  
made	  sense	  of	  amongst	  parents,	  relatives,	  schools,	  health	  care	  professionals	  and	  other	  
implicated	  actors.	  Rose	  calls	  for	  caution	  in	  reductionism	  and	  that	  laboratory	  findings	  do	  
not	  translate	  easily	  to	  real	  brains	  in	  situ	  (Rose	  2013:	  228f).	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The	  debate	  also	  shows	  the	  relevance	  of	  Roses	  argument	  that	  a	  paradigm	  shift	  in	  mental	  
illness	  has	  shifted	  focus	  from	  psychological	  explanations	  to	  neurological	  explanations.	  
This	  is	  exemplified	  in	  the	  following	  argument	  from	  professor	  Ole	  Mors:	  ‘Previously,	  
anxiety,	  for	  instance,	  was	  diagnosed	  exclusively	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  Freud’s	  theories:	  When	  a	  
neurosis	  occurred,	  it	  was	  due	  to	  a	  repression	  and	  therefore,	  there	  were	  symptoms.	  But	  
no	  one	  knew	  if	  it	  was	  the	  right	  interpretation	  in	  each	  singular	  case.	  That	  is	  why	  we	  have	  
ended	  up	  with	  a	  classification	  based	  on	  what	  everyone,	  also	  psychologist,	  can	  observe:	  
the	  observable	  symptoms	  and	  behaviour.	  I	  think	  that	  is	  more	  valid	  than	  hypothetical	  
theories	  about	  presumed	  causes’	  (Information	  17-­‐05-­‐2013).	  However,	  he	  also	  admits	  
that	  neurological	  research	  is	  still	  short	  of	  answers.	  
	  
It	  is	  also	  clear	  from	  the	  debate,	  that	  the	  neurochemical	  social	  imaginary	  meets	  some	  
resistance.	  It	  is	  also	  not	  surprising	  that	  representatives	  from	  the	  field	  of	  psychology	  take	  
a	  different	  approach	  than	  Ole	  Mors.	  Psychologist	  Allan	  Holmgren	  writes:	  ‘But	  the	  
psychiatric	  ‘science’	  has	  highhandedly	  taken	  the	  power	  of	  definition	  over	  ordinary	  
people’s	  problems,	  lives	  and	  identities	  through	  the	  diagnostic	  system,	  which	  does	  not	  
tell	  a	  meaningful	  story	  about	  the	  particular	  persons	  particular	  life’	  (Politiken	  29-­‐04-­‐
2013).	  The	  DR	  documentary	  Denmark	  on	  Pills	  also	  contributes	  to	  this	  debate.	  This	  is	  
done,	  for	  instance,	  in	  the	  case	  of	  the	  boy,	  Rasmus,	  who	  is	  being	  treated	  for	  ADHD	  with	  
Ritalin.	  During	  the	  programme	  he	  participates	  in	  family	  therapy.	  In	  the	  therapist’s	  
opinion	  medication	  would	  not	  have	  been	  the	  obvious	  answer	  and	  he	  provided	  
techniques	  for	  better	  interaction	  patterns	  amongst	  the	  family	  members	  (DR	  17-­‐04-­‐
2013).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  psychiatrist	  Per	  Hove	  Thomsen	  argues	  for	  medication	  being	  
the	  only	  form	  of	  treatment	  for	  ADHD	  that	  is	  evidence	  based	  and	  therefore	  the	  only	  
treatment	  that	  has	  documented	  effect	  (DR	  17-­‐04-­‐2013).	  
	  
Conclusion:	  Governing	  the	  brain	  
	  
For	  Foucault	  the	  state	  is	  absolutely	  central	  in	  the	  governing	  process	  in	  biopolitics.	  In	  
several	  cases	  reported	  in	  the	  newspapers,	  the	  state	  apparatus	  is	  clearly	  involved	  in	  
administering	  and	  regulating	  life-­‐processes	  and	  extended	  this	  regulation	  to	  the	  subjects’	  
bodies	  (Foucault	  1978).	  This	  is	  particularly	  the	  case	  when	  medication	  is	  promoted,	  or	  
indeed	  close	  to	  forced	  upon	  families	  and	  children,	  and	  diagnosis	  is	  thus	  used	  as	  a	  
technique	  of	  governance.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  when	  the	  	  
	  
Diagnosis	  as	  a	  tool	  for	  governance	  (Politiken,	  art.	  28):	  The	  County	  Administration	  
demands	  a	  diagnosis	  before	  they	  will	  consider	  giving	  support	  to	  parents	  (Politiken	  25-­‐
05-­‐2013).	  Likewise,	  the	  parents	  of	  Mikkel,	  the	  second	  child	  used	  as	  a	  case	  in	  the	  DR	  
documentary	  Denmark	  on	  Pills,	  refused	  to	  medicate	  their	  child	  and	  were	  as	  a	  result	  close	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to	  being	  declared	  unfit	  for	  parenting	  by	  the	  social	  services	  (DR	  17-­‐04-­‐2013).	  This	  
example	  shows	  the	  importance	  of	  resistance	  and	  how	  the	  individual	  acts	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  
negotiations	  of	  meaning	  in	  a	  complex	  situation	  in	  the	  public	  sphere.	  The	  parents	  in	  
question	  ended	  up	  involving	  the	  media	  and	  used	  it	  as	  a	  political	  tool	  to	  maintain	  their	  
reluctance	  towards	  medication	  as	  a	  form	  of	  treatment.	  Ultimately,	  biopolitics	  becomes	  a	  
locus	  for	  contestations	  over	  knowledge	  regimes	  and	  their	  authorities	  as	  well	  as	  which	  
intervention	  is	  required	  in	  questions	  ultimately	  of	  vitality,	  mortality	  and	  morbidity	  
(Rose	  2007).	  It	  certainly	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  case	  of	  the	  right	  to	  ones	  body	  (or	  ones	  child’s	  
body)	  and	  to	  subject	  or	  not	  subject	  it	  to	  a	  particular	  form	  of	  treatment.	  
	  
Rose	  argues	  for	  not	  overstating	  the	  role	  of	  the	  state	  in	  promoting	  such	  biopolitical	  
strategies	  (Rose	  2007).	  For	  him	  modern	  biopolitics	  increasingly	  takes	  the	  discursive	  
form	  of	  a	  liberal	  discipline	  in	  which	  the	  object	  of	  the	  strategies	  ceases	  to	  be	  the	  general	  
population	  and	  becomes	  the	  individual	  with	  his/her	  choices	  and	  responsibilities	  for	  
their	  own	  health	  within	  the	  wider	  context	  of	  the	  roles	  played	  by	  state	  institutions,	  
corporations,	  and	  other	  knowledge-­‐creating	  organisations.	  However,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that	  
this	  particular	  individualistic	  and	  liberalistic	  expression	  of	  the	  neurochemical	  social	  
imaginary	  is	  excluded	  in	  Foucaults	  concept	  of	  governmentality	  which	  does	  indeed	  
include	  techniques	  of	  self-­‐governance.	  The	  free	  choice	  –	  of	  hospital,	  treatment	  form	  etc	  –	  
can	  be	  seen	  in	  this	  light.	  However,	  eschewing	  any	  form	  of	  determinism	  in	  diagnosis	  and	  
treatment,	  it	  seems	  likely	  that	  the	  state	  exercises	  these	  new	  forms	  of	  pastoral	  power	  in	  
terms	  of	  the	  juxtaposition	  between	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  person	  is	  a	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  
‘contemporary	  understandings	  of	  the	  possibilities	  and	  limits	  of	  our	  corporality’,	  while	  
also	  drawing	  on	  an	  individuality	  ‘opened	  up	  by	  choice,	  prudence,	  and	  responsibility,	  to	  
experimentation,	  to	  contestation’	  (Rose	  2007:	  76).	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